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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN K. MANNING) 
Plaintiff and App~llant1 I 
vs. 
WESTERN AIRLINES~ a corporation~ 
and CONNECTICUT GENERAL 
LlFE INSURANCE COMPANY~ a 
corporation~ 
Defendants and ReJpondents. 
Case 
No~ 9109 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEivlENT OF FACTS 
Res pon J en ts consider a ppe lla nt, s s ta temen t of facts to 
be inadequate and misleading. Accordingly~ it .is contraverted 
generally~ and the folJowing statement is submitted. 
Appellant 'vas pl~intiff below. She is the Vilidov..T of Arthur 
~l. Manning. She also i~ the de signa ted beneficiary of the 
decedent to the extent o £ his par tici pa tion in three group 
insu ranee plans in effect betv..recn respondents, d ef en dan ts 
below: ( l) Group Life Insurance; ( 2) Group Accident and 
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Sickness Insurance; and (3) Group Hospital anJ Surgical 
Expense Benefits~ with a Family Benefit Option (Ex. D-1, 
D-3, D-9, P-6). 
By her complaint, appellant sought recovery against both 
respondent insurance company, hereinafter ca Ued ~ 'Connecti. 
cut·:>, and res pond en t air line, hereinafter called 4 'West ern'', 
decedenf.s employer, of $3,600.00 under such Group Life 
Insurance and of $ _:;~600. 00 under such Group Accident and 
... 
Sickness Insurance; Group Hospital and Surgical .Expense 
Benefits were not claimed (R. 1-2) . Respondents answered: 
( 1 ) denying a right of recovery under .such Group Life Insu r • 
ance in that decedent~ s coverage had been cancelJ ed prior to~ 
and was not in effect at~ his death; ( 2) denying a right of 
recovery under such Group Accident and Sickness Insurance 
in that such coverage did not provide for the payment of 
benefits for losses due to injuries arising out of~ or in the course 
of, any employment for wage or profit~ and (3) deny.ng~ in 
any event a right of recovery against Western (R. 3-'5). 
In the discovery period~ a p pell ant admitted that the death 
of Arthur M. Manning resulted from an accident ~vhich 
occurred in the course of his employment for ~vage or profit 
( R. 1 7, 12) . At pre-trial con f erente respondents in trod uc ed 
Group Accident and Sickness Insurance Certificate 8818, issued 
to decedent and containing the following exclusion: " . . . 
provided~ how ever, that this in sur a nee shall not cover 1 osses 
due to injuries arising out of> or in the course of, any employ· 
ment for \vage or profit" (Ex. D-3, p. 2) and the basic policy 
containing an equivalent clause (Ex. P -4, page 2) ~ By pre-
trial admission~ although apparently id~ntifying the \\-Tong 
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policy, a p pe llan t cone eded the ex is tenc e of such exclusion 
(R. 1St 3 7); in any event) no evidence denying its applicability 
\vas introduced. Accordingly): the pre-trial judge granted 
respondentst tnotion to dismiss that portion of appellanfs 
complaint relative to recovery of $3~600.00 under the Group 
Accident and Sickness Insu ranee ( R. 3 8) . Such dismissal was 
not disputed at trial and was incorporated in the final judgment 
of the trial court (R~ 78). There thus remained for resolution 
a.t trial the question of ~vhcther appellant \vas entitled to 
recover $.),600.00 from respondents as decedent's designated 
beneficiary under the Gl'oup Life Insurance PJan (R. 38). The 
case \\·as set for jury trial pursuant to appellant's demand 
(R. 36, 38). 
At the cotnme nce1nen t of the trial hearing~ the court stated: 
"The case was set this morning for jury trial, and I can:>t see 
a single fact in dispute" (R. 39). During the course of the 
proceedings, the trial judge sought stipulations of fact (R. 
59-63) , rejecting such of respondents' evidence as v,ras not 
stipulated to or acquiesced in by appellant (R~ 56). On the 
second day of triat the court said: !t ~ • ~ if after I hear this 
evidence I am going to + •• take the matter from the jury, if 
it is going to be of such a nature that reasonable minds couldn't 
disagree, I didntt want to call a jury .. ~ ~-~ (R+ 65-66) + Following 
jntroduction of evidence, stipulation of fact by respective 
counsel and an offer of proof by counsel for appellant (R. 67-
68), the trial court ruJ ed that there was no 1naterial of fact 
and ordered that the appellant's complaint be dismissed (R. 
78). 
The following are the undisputed facts: 
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( 1) On March 18, 1930~ respondents entered into a Group 
Life Insurance Polley \Vhich~ as amended) was effective at 
all times relevant to this action (Ex. D-9) . It provided that 
insurance rates might be changed from time to time (Ex. D-9; 
R. 51-52)~ It also provided, as did the pertinent employeets 
certificate~ that when a particular em ploy ee cancelled his payroll 
deduction order~ the coverage of such employee should cease 
at the end of the period for which the last deduction has been 
made (Ex+ P-6~ D-9). · 
(2) On A-fay 21, 1957, decedent was employed by Western 
(Ex~ D-1). 
( 3) On May 22, 195 7, decedent wa.s interviewed by the 
personnel division of \X/ estern. At that time he was in£ onned of 
the Group Insurance Plans available to Western employees, 
and ¥t·as handed an untilled application blank (Ex~ D-8~ D-9; 
R+ 54-55) . He Vitas also given~ as a part of the program of 
advising him of such plans, a booklet summarizing them ( App. 
Brf. p. 2; Ex. P-2) . It is unknown \vhether he received a 
supplement to the book I et ( R~ 60) . It is inaccurate to state 
that such booklet was prep a red and published as a joint cff ort 
on the part of respondents ( Ap p. Brf ~ p. 2) ; the sole evidence 
on the matter was the answers of respondents (R. 27~ 3.-f) 
to appellanfs written interrogatories (R. 23-24, 30-31). They 
indicated that such booklet, although checked as to f onnat by 
an official of Western, was prepared and published by Con· 
necticut~ 
( 4) Decedent did not execute the application for the 
group plans on l\-1ay 22t 1957 (Ex. D-8; R. 54-55). On May 
2 5, however, he did so~ applying for coverage under eacb 
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a vaj lable plan~ including Group Life Insurance (Ex. D-1) . 
Such cover age was extended. 
( 5) l}nder date of June .·!) 19 57 7 d€cedent transmitted to 
E. H. BroVJt·n~ Personnel Director of Western (Ex. D~ 7) ~ a 
document \vhich respondents chose to denominate and the 
trial court interpreted to be, a npayroll deduction cancellation 
request'' but 'vhich appclJant chooses to call an inquiry ( App. 
Brf-~ p. 3) ~ Respondents object to argumentative labeJJing 
in a recitation of facts on appeal; the important fact is that 
the communication which \Vas f or\varded read: n I v.dsh to drop 
the life insurance part of my policy if possible. Thank you, /s/ 
Arthur M. Manning'~ (Ex. D-7, R. 7,.1-75). 
( 6) As of the close of the month of June~ 19 57~ Western 
notified Connecticut of the cance lla tlo n of decedent's group 
life insurance coverage (Ex. D-1, Dr 10, D-11; R. 55- 56). 
Thereafter~ no deduction for group life insurance was made 
from the pay of decedent (Ex. D-5), and no premium was paid 
by Western to Connecticut for such coverage (Ex. D-1 0; R. 55). 
Respondents make parti(ular objection to the second 
paragraph of a p pe llan f s statement of facts \\·' hich deals \V ith 
the cost of such group insurance to the employee and the 
deductions \vhich \vere made therefrom ( App. Rrf. p. 2) T The 
only possible rei eva nee that these facts would have VlO u 1 d be 
to ~hov.r (a) that as the amount deducted from decedent's pay· 
check for ins u ranee a£ ter receipt of decedent's rcq ues t to 
cancel hjs policy \vas $1.80 less ( $ L 1.70 as opposed to ill3.50), 
and as the amount of the life insurance premium set forth .ln 
the booklet \vas S ·1.80, this is corroborative of the fact that 
Western did actually cancel J\1anningts life insurance coverage 
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(a fact whjch is undisputed in any event [Ex. D~ l t D-1 0, 
D-11; R. 55-56]); (b) that appellant by receipt of these payroll 
deduction stubs \Vas thereby notified that his request to ca.nce 1 
had been honored; and (c) that for some rea5on the booklet~ 
given to employees explaining the various group policies of 
the company constituted an offer to.insure forever the employee-
recipient of the booklet~ at the rate set forth in the booklet 
furnished~ 
The first two points are only of material assistance to 
respondents~ not appellants~ The latter paint, although argued 
by appellant below~ is now abandoned and need not be con-
sidered) as appellant states that ~1.there is one basic is5ue to 
be decided by this appealt' (App+ Brf., p. 6) which is whether 
the life insurance policy had been cancelled. 
The only complicating factor as to deductions \vas that 
on December 1~ 1956~ the amounts deductible from employee's 
pay £or certain of the group coverages (not including I if e 
ins ur a nee) were increased ( R. 56· 57) . Th ust of course, that 
portion of the old booklet which set forth rates (Ex. P-2) would 
not be applicable after December 1 ~ 195 6.. The undisputed 
evidence ~·as that for a period after December 1st Western 
continued to hand its new employees the old booklet~ together 
Vt7ith a mimeographed supplement showing the rate change.s~ 
and that in :tVlay of 1957 (the month in which Manning ·wa5 
hired) a new booklet was printed showing the new rates. 
Western's employee who interviewed Manning can only testify 
as to the above general procedure and that she did give ~-1 anning 
a booklet (R. 60) . 
It is not unreasonable to assume that Manning either 
10 
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received the old booklet with the mimeographed supplement 
or the new booklet because this would be consistent with 
general company policy. But, of course, it is. completely im-
material what Mrs. Manning said her hu.sband received since 
she w .as not present at the time. Certainly it is com pl etel y 
unfair to p.ssert, as appellant does, that .. deductions were being 
taken on the basis of a new sched uie which the evidence 
would show had never been given to decedent and of Vt-Thich 
he was not a~rare" (App. Brf. p. 2). Respondents contend 
that the \v ho 1 e issue is immaterial and i r rei evant in any event. 
Both the old and new pamphlets showed a life insurance deduc-
tion of $1.80 per month (Ex. Pw2, R. 11). It is undisputed 
that appellant received toe payroJl de4uction vouchers showing 
a reduction of $1.80 in his total insurance payments (Ex. DwS). 
Which ever booklet decedent received thus makes no difference. 
Responden'b·also object¥ to appellanfs references to con-
versations between the decedent and his wife ( eTg., App. 
Brf.l p. 3-4). What the decedent said to his wife about these 
matters is irrelevant, immaterial and inadmissable as the 
purest type of hearsay (R. 68-69) . How ever~ as respondent.,.. 
will show in this brief~ as a matter of law it makes no difference 
for purposes of reso 1 ving this case what w· as sa.id between the 
decedent and his vrife. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
I 
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE CANCELLA TIOK 
OF A POLICY; JT CONCERNS COVERAGE OF AN EM-
PLOYF.E~ 
11 
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AppeUant's. brief argues in terms of whether or not •4the 
life insurance policy had been cance11edt' ( App. Brf.~ p. 6). 
Such ph r as eo 1 o gy is unfortunate~ bee au s e inaccurate. The only 
pol icy here involved (Ex. D-9) ~Tas between Western and 
Connecticut and was in effect at all times here pe rtin cnt. As 
is stated in 2 9 Am. J u r ., l ns Ufanc e § 13 7 2 : 
~tit is genera1ly held that an employee's contract of 
insurance under the group plan consists of the policy 
issued by the insurer to the employer; the individual 
certificate delivered by the employer to the employee 
is no part of such con tract, but on 1 y an instrument 
reciting the employee·s right to protection under the 
terms of the group policy so long as there is compliance 
v,..~ith the conditions of the policy.~~ 
The quoted Ian guage squares with the ruanda te of the 
Utah legislature, found at 31-23-2 (3) UCA ( 1953), which 
requires that nthe policy~ the application of the employer and 
the· indiv1dual applications~ if any, shalJ constitute the entire 
contract between the parties . . ~ The individual certificate 
. ~ . issued by the insurance company setting forth a statement 
as to the insurance protection to which the individual is 
en tit! ed shall not become a part of the coo tract betvieen the 
parties.~. 
The problem ~vhich is here involved is . whether or not 
the decedent was~ at the 6me of his demise~ entitled to the 
coverage afforded by such existent policy. This depends, in turn~ 
upon 'vhether decedenfs coverage was~ prior to his death~ 
terminated by virtue of his communication to \Xlestern (Ex. 
D-7), Western~s consequent stoppage of group life deductions 
and its notification to Connecticut of the termination of such 
coverage (Ex~ D-10, D-11) ~ 
12 
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II 
THIS CASE IS GOVERNED BY PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
APPLICABLE TO GROUP lNSURANCE. 
Th~ inaccuracy of appellant· s designation of the question 
here involved reflects a lack of underst.andingj not shared by 
the courts, of the distinctive characteristics of group insurance~ 
Group life insurance represents na distinct form of insur-
ance differing in many, j f not most of its aspects from the 
ordinary life insurance)'' Miller v. Travelers Insurance Com· 
panyj 143 Pa. Super~ 270, 17 A.2d 807 ( 1941) ~ nGroup life 
insurance cliff ers from ordinary old -line Life insurance,'~ Leach 
v. Metro poll tan Life I nsttrance Com pany1 124 Kan~ 5 84~ 261 
Pac. 603 ( 1927); reh. den. 125 Kan. 129~ 263 Pac. 784 ( 1928). 
In this regard, it is worthy of note that the Utah legislature, 
recognizing that group I if e ins u ranee possesses special charac~ 
teristics, has enacted separate 1 e gisla tion pertitien t thereto., Title 
31, Chapter 23, UCA ( 1953) + The following excerpt from 
29 Am. Jur~ 1 Insurance, § 1371, expresses some of these dis-
tinctions: 
~~The group ins ur a nee con tract is peculiar in that it is 
made by the insurer and the cmpJoyer or someone in 
an anale go us position t ~ instead of betv!leen t];:le insurer 
and the insured, as in oth cr con tracts of insurance~ thus 
affecting £our parties,-the i o surer~ the e_n;. pi oyer~ the 
lSc(' 31-23-1, UCA ( 1953) and 7 Encyclopaedia of tht!_ Social Sciences, 
Gf ou p Insurance. p. 18 2 j for enumerations of those organizations! 
business units and political entities whose position is analagous to 
that of the employer. Among them are t~ade unions, consumersj co-
operative societies, educational institutions:> lending inst1tutions, and 
municipalities. 
13 
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insured and the beneficiary. Also, group insurance is 
often times a gratuity in that the employer pays either 
the whole or a part of the premium~ Group insurance 
di£f ers from old .1 ine life insurance~ but is similar in 
many respects to \Vorkman~ s compensation insurance, 
in that each is secured by the employer for the benefit 
of the employee, and in that emp toyrnent is a conditiont 
precedent to each to be effective~ It should be berne 
in mind~ however~ that group insurance is not indemnity 
ins u ranee for the benefit of the employer~ but insurance 
on the life of the employee for his persrinal benefit 
and the protection of thO$e depending upon him, and 
1~ in addition to and distinct from workmant s com~ 
pensation provided for by the 1 a'vs of the state.' t (Am. 
J u r. footnotes eliminated; p re5en t footnote supplied.) 
III 
BY THE NATURE OF A GROUP POLICY, THE EM-
PLOYER, WESTERN! IS NOT LIAHLE TO APPELLANT. 
The employer is not 1 iab l e in a 5ui t to recover the benefits 
under the policy, MaJon~s Adm~x v. Prudential insurance Con1~ 
panyt 291 Ky. 347, 164 S.W. 2d 328 ( 1945); Peyton r·. i\1etro-
politan Life lnJurance CompanJ, 148 So. 721 (La. App~, 1933); 
Galleger v. Simtnons Hardware Company1 214 Mo. App. 111, 
258 S.W. 16 ( 1924); Haneline t.-'. Tufner W hlte Casket Coni-
pan y ~ 2 38 N .C+ 127 ~ 76 S.E~ 2d 3 72 ( 195 3) . The reasoning 
of the cases is swnmarized at 8 Cou[hts Cyclopedia of lnJHrttJh:e 
Law,§ 2094: 
~~Since a contract for group insu ranee is between 
the employer and the insurer for the benefit of the 
employee., the right of act ion by the employee or his 
14 
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beneficiary or representative is against the insurer~ and 
not against the employer, between whom and the 
employee there is no contract of insurance.'"' 
Whether the issue is phrased in terms of cancellation (as 
in appellant's brief) or of coverage (as in this brief)~ it is 
clear that appellant no~.. con tends that she is en tit 1 ed to recovc r 
on the master policy. That being the case~ Western is not liable 
to appellant 
IV 
UNDER THE GROUP POLICY HERE INVOLVED, 
THE RELATIONSHIP Ol WESTERN TO DECEDENT 
WAS THAT OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL+ 
The document of greatest importance to this case is a 
communication from decedent-employee to Western., his em-
ployer (Ex. D-7) . Jt is, therefore, requisite that their relation-
ship be defined. 
In BoJeman P. Connecticut General Life lnsufance Cotn-
pany, 301 U.S. 196, 57 S+ Ct~ 686, 81 L_ Ed. 1036~ 11 o A.L~R. 
732 ( 1937) ~affirming 84 F.2d 701 ( 5 Cir., 1936), the United 
State5 Supreme Court stated~ at 301 U.S~ 204-5: 
~~When procuring the pol icy j obtaining applications 
of employees] taking payroll deduction orders, report-
ing changes in the insured group., paying premiums and 
generally in doing what ever necessary to obtain and 
keep the insurance in force, employers act not as agents 
of the insurer but for their employees and for them-
selves.·' (Citations eli rninated.) 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In making this s t.atement~ the Supreme Court cited the 
initial judicial analysis 0£ the rel a tionshi r 0 f employee vis -a-v j J 
employer under the group insurance plan~ found in Dufal v. 
A1etropolitan Life Insurance Co1n pany1 82 N.H. 543, A. 400. 
50 A.L.R. 1276, 1282-3 ( 1927): 
!tThe claim that the employer is the agent of the 
insurer in the collection and fol"Vlarding of premiwns 
is ~Tholly v..="ithout foundationr By the express terms 
of the policy the company looks to the employer for 
the payment of the premiums. It has no concern with 
whether it collects part of them from the employee or 
not. The employee is insured because he has made· a p-· 
plicationj and because the employer promises to pay 
the insurer the premiums. The promise to pay is for the 
benefit of the employee~ 
t ~Again~ it is urged tha t1 as tn e provisions as to 
notice of claim~ p .roof of loss~ etc~ are contained in 
the tnaster po 1 icy~ th er efo re the em player is the in-
surer's agent to give information of these subjects. It 
is said that the whole purpose of the group insurance 
scheme would be frustrated unless the employer co-
operates with the employee as agent lby implication j for 
the insurer. 
\~That the employer is expected to cooperate with the 
employee is evident~ The whole scheme is paternalistic. 
The error of counsel, here and elsewhere, is in failing 
to appreciate that the paternalism is that of employer 
towards employee. It does not have the effect of making 
tn e ben evo lent parent the agent of the party v.·· i th 
\vhom he inaugurates a contract for the benefit of his 
children. The line dividing the three parties to the 
contract according to their interest and real position 
in these transactions puts the employer with the em-
ployee) as opposed to the insurer. 'J 
16 
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With the decision of further cases involving group insur-
ancel the vie"· that the employer acts as an agent of the 
employee has become standard. 2 
The fact that an em p Ioyer does not act as the agent of 
the insurance carrier was recognized by this court in Ralston 
l 1• Metropolitan Life lnJurance Compan)", 90 Utah 496:t 62 
P .2d 1119 ( 19 36) . In that case~ the employee sought recovery 
of total and permanent disabiJity benefits provided for by the 
group life policy in effect between the insurance company and 
Southern Pacific Company~ his empJoyerT One of the issues 
at trial and upon appeal was whether proof of claim h.ad been 
2 1 Appleman~ lnJurance Lau· r-nni Practice, § 43; 29 Am. Jur. 1 lnsur~ 
ance § 1:)79; C.J.S., lnJurance~ · § 140; Metropolitan Life lnJtJ.rance 
Comp~ny v QuHt;·~ 92 F .2 d 829 ( 7 Cir ') 193 7) ; Connecticut General 
Life Insurance C()mpany v. Speerj 18 5 Ark 615, 48 S.W. 2d 55 3 
~ ( 1932) : B!aylol:k v. Prudential insurance C rJfftpany, 84 Ga. App. 
641, 67 S.E. 2d 17 3 ( 1951) ; T higpin 1!, Metropolitan Life 1 nsurance 
Company, 57 Ga. App. 405~ 195 S.E_ 591 ( 1938); Ldncaster v. 
Travelers Insurance Com pan)', 53 Ga. App. 718, 189 S.E. 79 ( 1936); 
Metropolitan Life Insurance- Company v. H enr)', 217 Ind. 33, 2:-i 
N.E. 2d 918 (1940); Mnt·dles v. Equitable Life AJsurdnce Soc.f 
115 Ind. App. 56\ 60 N.E. 2d 747 ( 1945); Ledth v. Meuopolitan 
Life lnJurance Companyj supra; Masanj 1 Adnl x 11. Prudential Insur-
ance Company1 supra; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Hall, 2)3 
Ky. 347~ 164 S.W. 2d 386 ( 1934); Kloidl ·v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Compan;·! 18 N.J. Misc. 661~ 16 A.2d 274 (1939); Penple 
ex. rf!l. Kirkman v. Van Amringe, 266 N.Y. 277, 194 N.E. 754 (1935); 
Rivers v. State Ca.pital Life JnJurance Company, 245 N.C. 461, 96 S.E. 
ld q31, 68 A_L_R. 2d 205 (1957); Haru!line F. Turner White Casket 
Companyj supra; Dewedse v. Trave-lers Insurance Conlpanyj 208 N.C. 
732~ 182 S.E. 447 ( 19' 5); Hrobla.k i/. i'..-le!ro politan Life In.sUfd.nce 
Companyf 79 N.E. 2d 360 (Ohio App., 1947); Hanaieff v. Equitable 
Life Assurance- Soc., 71 Pa. S60, 92 A.2d 202 (1952); Best v. Equitable 
Life AiJtJra.nce Soc./' 16) Pa. Super. 452;o 68 A.2d 400 ( 1949), aff'd. 
36S Pa. 41St 76 A.2d 220 ( 1950); McFadden v. Equitdb!e Life As-
surance Soc., 3) 1 Pa. "5 70J 41 A. 2d 62 4 ( 194 S); Miller v. Tra.velel s 
ln!ura.nce Com pa.ny! supra; ln.rttfdtJCt Compd'lt)' v. J acksonj 12 Tenn. 
App. 305 ( 1931). 
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furnished to the insurance company. The employee adduced 
evid encc that he had furnished such proof to Southern Pacific 
and that it had denied his claim. On the basis of this undisputed 
evidence, tht· trial court instructed the jury that Metropolitan 
has V!tr ai ved due proof of claim. This court reversed, hoi ding 
at 62 P~2d 1121: 
"This letter of ]\.larch 3, 1931, from the Southern 
P acme Company to RaJ ston ~ containing a denial of 
liability, did not bind the insurance company. The 
Southern Pacific Company ~~as not the agent of the 
defendant for that purpose. The courf s instruction 
directing the jury that due proof of plain tiff~ s dis~ 
ability was ~yaived on March 3 ~ 1 9 3 1 t was error.~~ 
Both .concurring opinions expressly voiced agreement with 
this vie~v~ Mr. Justice follandts at 62 P.2d 1124 and Mr. Justice 
Wolfe's at 62 P.2d 1125. The decision is in accord with the 
Korth Carolina case of Dewease v. Trareler s Insurance Corn-
panJ~ 5upra. AppeHants are unable to read into Bucher L 
Equitable Life AssuraNce Soc, 91 Utah 179~ 63 P.2d 604 
( 1936), cited by appellant (App. BrL~ p. 1)) ~ an overruling 
by this court of the principle recognized in Ralston which 
had been decided ten days previously. Bucher did not involve 
the relationship betv"·een employee and employer) but) rather, 
the attempt by an insurer to set up a defense based upon a 
provision not in the ma5ter policy. 
lnastn uch as the employer acts as agent of the employee, 
not of the insurer, service of process upon the employer does 
not constitute service upon the insurer, Connecticut Gc11eral 
Life l;Hurance Company l ... Speer~ supra; Blaylock l'. Pr!tdential 
/n.l"urdJh'e C(nJJ pan_r, supra. Nor can the employer bind the 
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insurer by accepting p rem i u1ns subsequent to the cancellation 
of the master policy~ Lancaster l'. Travelerj s Insurance Con1~ 
t~tn y~ supra. 
By like token, the rules of the la.v... .. of agency apply to the 
relationship behveen the employer and employee. The follow-
ing case is an illustration: 
In 1\-le!ropolitan Life Insurance Cotnpany l ... 11 enr_r, supra~ 
j t \Vas claimed that the employee did not have notice of the 
tnaximum time in which proof of claim might be made. The 
Indiana Supreme Court rejected the respondent~ s position, 
noting: ( 1) it 'vas undisputed that the master policy at all 
times pe rtin en t \Vas in the physical posse.s.~ion of the em p 1 oyer; 
(2) under Indiana Jaw~ knowledge of the terms of a policy 
by its possessor is conclusive 1 y pres uine?; and ( 3) the know 1 w 
edge of the employer-agent was imputed, as a matter of law, 
to tbe emp1oyee~principa1. The rule of the H ent)' case was 
applied by the Indiana AppelJate Court in lrtorales v. Equitable 
Life AJSUfance Soc~, supra, which involved the employee's 
claimed 1 ack of knowledge of a tern porary lay -off provision. 
In Mason·\ Adrn'x r. Prudential Insurance Coutpan_r~ 
supra, the employee (for whom his administratrix was substi~ 
tuted follo,ving his death) sought to recover from the insurer 
disability benefits under a group policy. The in surer de£ ended 
on the ground that the policy h.as been cancelled by .it and the 
employer. The Kentucky Supre1ne Court held that the ern pJoyer ~ 
in procuring the policy, acted for the benefit of its employees, 
including Mason. It stated at 164 S.W. 2d 388-9: • 
"Such agency was ratified by application for coverage 
under the poltcy and the contract completed on a.ccept-
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a nee of the cet tifi ca tc under the po 1 icy. Therefore the 
railroad company's act in cancelling the policy was 
the act of the ins uted+' ~ 
T h c relationship bet'v een decedent an J Western relative 
to the group policy in question was that of agent and principaL 
Through the card (Ex. D-1) by 'J··hich decedent accepted the 
policy of group insurance he express! y authorized Western 
to act in his behalf in deducting premiums from his ~·ages. 
By the communication dated June 4, 1957~ decedent instructed 
Western as follows : 4.' I v.-~ish to drop the ·life ins urancc j pat t 
of my policy if possible~ Thank you.'· Western~ in reliance 
thereon (it is not con tended by a p p e 1 tan t that Western'~ 
actions ~vere f ra udu lent) ceased to 1n ake J i fc insurance Jed uc· 
tions and informed Connecticut that decedent's insurance had 
been term ina ted (Ex. D-1 0, 11) ~ D eced en t, consequently 
appellant, \Vas bound by such notification. 
v 
UNDER APPLICABLE RULES AS TO COMMUNICA-
TIONS BETWEEN AGENT AND PRINClP AL, DECE-
DENT~S COVERAGE \X' AS TERMINATED. 
Appellant confuses the more exacting tests courts have 
applied to the cane ella tion of non· group insu ranee policies 
\\:ith the instant case, which involves an instruction from 
pr inci pa 1 to agent~ 
Respondent contends that the communication dated June 
• 4j 1957, is clear and unan1biguous under any reasonable inter-
Pretation. But giving a p pe llan t every benefit and conceding 
arguendo that the communication ~·] wish to drop the ·life 
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insurance~ part of my policy if possible. ~'Thank you ts 
subject to being construed as a mere inquiry, it surely cannot 
be con tended that it is un reasonable to cons true this as a 
request to drop decedent from the group coverage. At most, 
appellant contends that the comm u o i cation in question is 
ambiguous+ Granting this premise~ it is reasonably susceptible 
to the interpretation placed upon it by Western~ 
In such event, it is clearly established that neither respond-
ent is liabLe to appellant. Mecham on Agency (2d Ed.) § 1266 
states: 
~ t If the pr inci pa 1 desires his instructions to be 
pursued! it is obviously necessary that he should make 
them intelligible and clear. If how ever they arc so 
ambiguous as to be fairly capable of two interpreta-
tions and the agent in good faith and with due dili-
gence adopts one of them~ he cannot be held liable 
to the principal for a loss that may result on the lattee s 
-claim that he meant the other~'' 
This vie~r is adopted by the Restatement of Agency 2d, 
§ 26: 
n ~ , T allthority to do an act can be created by 
written or spoken words or other conduct of the prin-
cipal v,; hich~ reasonably interpreted, causes the agent 
to believe that the principal desires him. so to act on 
the principars accounL" 
This rephrases the rule that a document is to· be construed 
most strongly against its drafter, Restatenu:nt of Contractsf 
§ 235(d)+ 
Indeed~ the request to drop decedent from group coverage 
is put to no more exacting tests as to interpretation than the 
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original request by d eced en t to make the deductions, which 
automatically placed him within the covered group. 
Jr is elementary that the principaJ is bound by the proper 
act of h.ls agent, LinJeed Oil Cotn pan;: t 1• Montagio and Smith; 
65 IOVII'a 67') 21 N.\X'. 184 ( 1884); Fa/skin 1), r~alls City State 
BankJ 71 Neb. 29~ 98 1\J.W. 425 ( 1904); Picket v. Parsons, 
l 7 Vt. 4 70 ( 184 5) . 
lnastnuch as Western} decedenfs agent, acted properly 
in relying on decedent's communication of his payroll deduction 
order, decedent's group 1ife coverage was terminated~ 
Vl 
THERE WAS NO JURY QUES1riON. 
Appellant contends that as the communication of June 4, 
1957 (Ex. -D-7) \vas nsufficiently ambiguous·~ appellant should 
have been able to submit the matter to a jury ( App. Brf. p~ 19). 
It is submitted that appellant confuses the function of 
judge and jury in this case. By definition the word ~·ambiguous'"' 
means t
4
capable of being understood in either of t\VO or more 
possible senses~'~ W ebsters New International DictionarJ~ 
Unabridged, 2d Ed_ By appelJant's very statement (which 
re5pondent does not concede) as the statement \VaS t~ambigu­
ous~~ it was one on V~t~hich two reasonable people could disagree. 
Thus) even if \'X? estern placed .a different meaning on the 
communication rhan \\·hat was intended~ as it ~vas concededly 
ambiguous, Western's condtiCt \\'a~ concededly reasonable. As 
a jury is only entitled to pass upon rna tte rs concerning ~r h ich 
reasonable men can disagree) and as by appellant's own postu-
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lation the action of Western was reasonable~ there is no jury 
question. 
Moreover, the tria I co U! e s ruling it consistent with the 
well-established general rule that the interpretation, construc-
tion, meaning and legal effect of written instruments are 
matters of law for the court. As Mr. Justice Brandeis states: 
t, The construction and effect of a written instrument is a 
question of law.~~ Su·ift and Companyv~ Hocking Valley R. Co., 
243 U. S. 281~ 37 S. Ct. 287, 61 L. Ed. 722 at 725 ( 1917). 
The Eighth Circuit) in denying defendant's claim that the 
meaning of the \Vritten language in question should have 
been left to the jury~ quoted 'v ith approval the foil owing 
general rule: 
(~Undoubtedly, the general rule is that the question 
whether written instruments constitute a contract, as 
well as the interpretation of such written instruments 
when it is determined that they do constitute a con-
tract~ belongs to the court, and not to the jury.~' Dr a in~ 
age DiJtrict No~ 1 v. Rude~ 21 Fr2d 257 (8 Cir., 1927). 
See Digest, Key No. Co~ tracts, 176. 
Utah law recognizes this rule. Thus § 78-21~3 UCA 1953 
requires that ~!All q ues tio n s of 1 a li;V including . . . the con-
struction of statutes and other wt<itin g s . . . are to be decided 
by the court and . all discus s.ions of Ia w addressed to it.~) As 
this court has stated, in holding that the trial court erred in 
submitting a question of the meaning and construction of a 
written document to the .. jury that ~ tThe legal effect of written 
instruments is necessarily a question of law, and hence is one 
that must be determined by the court. To that rule there is 
no exception ... :>, Verdi v. fl elpet' Stale Bank, 57 Utah 502, 
196 P. 225 at 228, 15 A.L.R~ 641 ( 1921) ~ 
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Appellant claims no oral or written communication to 
~'estern supplemental to decedent's writing of June 4l 1957. 
Appellant admits this communication was the rt on/ y commu-
nication~t (App. Brf. p. 15) + What he said to his wife about 
this is in admissable and irrelevant. The legal effect of the 
communication must be found from its four corners. As this 
court has very recently held) a pc rson t 5 undisclosed intention 
can not vary the Ian guage of a written instrument~ Clyde t·. 
Eddington Cannery Co.1 ---· L"tah -- .. , 347 P.2d 563 ( 1959) 7 This 
job the trial court quite pro per l y assumed. 
The trial court extensively reviewed the case and the 
facts with counsel. .A .. ppellant has £ailed to show any specific 
facts~ other than the interpretation of the 'vrltlng of June 4, 
1957, which she contends would have gone to a jury. Indeed 
there are non e. 
Our rules are designed for the most expeditious disposition 
of 1 itigation + As this court quite recently pointed out ~ tT he 
letter and spirit of our rules are tdesigned toward effectuating 
an lnex pensi-ve and ex: peditious d eterm ina tion of l i ti ga tion. j t ~ 
Aetna Loan Company v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of i\Luy-
land: ____ Utah 7---~ 346 P~2d 1078 ( 19 59) 7 
VII 
DECEDENT~S COJVIMUNICATION OF JUNE 4, 1957~ 
CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY EXPRESSED HIS IN-
TENTION TO DROP HIS LIFE COVERAGE. 
Despite the fact that, as pointed out above., a communi-
cation from employee to employer is not bound by the standards 
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as to clarity which courts have set forth as to reguests for 
cancel! a tion rna de from an insured to an insurer, it is submitted 
that the communication in question meet5 even these tests 
and is reasonably capable of no other interpretation. 
The policy provides for termination of coverage ~~if any 
employee cancels his einployee deduction order1 j (Ex. D-9). 
There was no particular form prescribed for effecting such 
cane ella tion and under genera 1 rules of insurance 1 a w ~ t no 
particular form of notice of request 1s requisite~' ( 45 C~ J.S. 
Insurance~ § 458, p~ 117. Even where the use of a particular 
form appears in any policy it is inserted" clearly for the con-
venience of the in~uranc e company and tan be waived by it 
by accepting such requests in other ~T a ys. This has even been 
held to be the case where the insurance company did not in 
fact treat such a request on an unauthorized fo rrn as a can~ 
.cellation~ In a recent Virginia case, the insured wrote to the 
company ... Please cancel my Policy # 34230-NS-46 as of today. 
Please return my earned premiwn~ I am getting rid of my 
car and will not need insurance. T·hanking you for your co-
operation.~' The company replied that ·the request had been 
referred to its ag~t. The agent titled out a form, nPolicy 
Ho 1 der ~ s Re9ues t for Cancellation, j' and mailed it to the 
insured who never 5j gned it. Nevertheless~ the court bel d that 
the insured~ s letter affected cancellation~ Stttte fat'm .l\Jutual 
Anto Insurance Co. v. Pedersonj 185 Va. 941, 11 S.E. 2d 64 
( 1947). The receipt of such a request effectively terminates 
in sur a nee without any further action by the insurance com-
pany. Where an insured ~Trote requesting cancelJation on 
March 1, had a fire loss on the 13th, and the insurance com-
pany wrote notifying the insured that the policy had been 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cancelled as of March 1 7 ~ the court nevertheless held that 
the po !icy had been e£f ectivel y terminated as of the 1st. The 
court held that the t eques t ipso fat" I o operated to terminate 
the contract. Atlantic Fire Insurance Co. of R.aleigfJJ 1'-lorth 
G'afollna v. SrnithJ 183 Okla. 97~ SO P.2d 216 ( 1938). 
AppeiJant cites S~tJkatchen·,ln Government lnJufance 
0 ffire t\ Padget; 245 F+2d 48 (S Grr, 1957) .. The case is of 
no assistance to u.s~ as that court points out that ~.There is no 
provision in the policy issued by Saskatchewan which permits 
cancellation by or on behalf of Padget [the insured] .. , Nor 
is this court aided in this case by decisions turning on inter-
pretations of lengthy communications, construed .ln their 
entirety, [e.g-~ Phillips v. Hir;chi~ 92 Mich ~693~ 201 N+W. 
1.96 ( 1942)]. The conununication before this court is the 
epitome of brevity~ 
Appellant strains to torture the communication as a mere 
request for information. This is done by emphasizing the use 
of the words !twishH and 1- 4if possiblen. The use of other 
decisions is only of limited value because the statement must 
be construed in its own contexL Thus the words ~ .. if possible'~ 
and the context of the communication .at most condition the 
request on the objective fact of the possib iii ty o £ Western's 
being able to do the required act. Objectively. it \\'as possible 
to drop the I ife insu ranee coverage, and thus the objective 
condition was met) and Western acted within tb is possib i 1 i ty. 
There are no other conditions set forth in the note. 
As to the word nwisht' one need go no further th.an the 
dictionary to sustain tb e tria 1 court 1 s interpretation. Thus 
1
'wish'' is defined as meaning inter alia ~~to request; command''. 
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I 
The noun is defined as ~ .. ex press ion of d esj re; request petition+'· 
Webster~s New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 2d Ed~ 
Going no further than appellanfs own cited source we find 
the statement nwish to cancerj as used in a letter stating that 
the writers ~·wish to cancel'· a certain con tract, ~ ~ imports noth-
ing in the nature of a request for consent or deference to the 
views of the other party. It announces, though in civil phrase., 
the intention of the writer to ex c rcise his right reserved to 
him.~. n, Ireland vi> DickJ 130 Pa. 299) 18 A .. 735, 736 (1889); 
45 Words and Phrases, p. 361+ 
In Gately·H aire Co. v. Niagara }'ire I nsufance Company, 
221 N.Y. 162, 116 N.E. 1015 ( 1917); the insured wrote the 
company~ '[·on taking our inventory, we .find we are carrying 
more insurance than is nee essary. We wish to cancel Policy 
1\,. o. 15 ~ 99 7 + • • + This cancellation to take e.ff ect at once. 
Please give this matter your immediate attention and oblige.~' 
The insured subsequently a·rgued, as ap pe llan t does here, that 
the word 4 ~wisht! indicated that the letter was mereJy the 
expression of a hope, rather than a request. The court disagreed 
and held that the policy had been cancelled. 
One need only consider that this ""·as the communication 
betw'een an employee to his superior to understand that the 
decedent would naturally wish to preserve the normal amenities 
of poll te correspondence. Surely it waul d have been most 
unusual for a newly-hired employee to couch such a request 
in words, for example~ ~'I demand my life insurance cove rage 
be dropped forthwith!'~ Courtesy certainly is not so exceptional 
that we should atlow its day-to-day use to alter the clear 
meaning of business communication. 
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Moreover~ assuming that the decedent was in any doubt 
as to ~rbether his request had been acted upon, he need only 
have observed that his ins ur a nee deductions a£ ter the end 
of the payrperiod following the submission of his reguestJ 
reflected a deduction of $1.8 0 1 ess than previousLy. The $1.80 
tv as the amount shoVtrn as that portion of the life ins u ranee 
pre1nium which em ploye-ts v..·ere to pay in the brochure which 
appellant admits decedent received. Whi I e as observed above 
confirmation by the insurance company of a request to cancel 
is unnecessary~ the request operating ipsu facto to affect thjs] 
it is clear, as the tria i court pointed out, that decedent was 
advised of this in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case raises the issue as to whether d eced cnt 
\vas included 'vithin the life insurance portion of his employee's 
group insurance po hey at the time of his death. The em pJoyer 
is not liable in any event. Decedent was not included at the 
time of his death bee a use of a prior \v ri tten communication 
from him to his em player, acting as his principal~ \v hich could 
reasonably be construed as a request to drop this coverage, 
the employer did drop decedent from this coverage and ceased 
[() withhold that portion of the premium chargeable to the 
employee for life insurance. Moreover~ even if the conununi-
ca tion from decedent were ca. te gorized as a !e<j, u est from the 
insured to his insurer to cancel a policy~ \~· hich respondent 
contends it is notj the communication clearly and unequivocally 
expressed decedent· s intention to drop his coverage and such 
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coverage was terminated upon the pay-period following its 
receipt Thus, respondent respectfully urges that the decision 
of the tria 1 court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Albert J. Col ton 
Kent Shearer 
Attot<neys jot" Respondents 
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